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Tbe joresl oj easIer" 1!l8brlllislan. cons isis oj two prill/my Iypes; a 
lowelevalion broCidleajjorest oj evergreen oak, and a bigb ele-
lIalion con!/er joresi. "/ z,e tlveretge Ajgban is dependellt upon Ibe 
oak joresl jar Ibe daily rrecessilies ojjl.lelwood and jodrler. 7be 
con!lerjoresl provides prized cleodar ceclar as a comlllercial procl-
uct enricbing crimilltll ~yf/dicales and if/sllrgenl orgcmizalions. 
Tbe siruiy 7//tlkesjive gelleral jinclings. Firsl, Ibe /"Ole o/timber r-ev-
elllle as a source cd" barel currellcy Jor insurgent organizatiolls is 
il/creasil/g. Secolld, Ibe il/egallimber l/"tIcie poses a direct Ibreal 10 
sl/cces..yid cOl/.llterillsllrgellcy operaliolls. 7bird, Ibe limber trade 
1l:ldcr, I lann:l, and I)ougbs were Ihe principal lC'ddcrship of the Natural HC!'OllfCCS 
Counterinsurgency r.ell (NRCC) in c3slcrn Afghani!\wn, c~l:lblbhcd under T:lsk Force 
MounWin Warrior (TFMW). '111l! nee opcr.lt(.'C1 from Fehruary 20 10 through M~ly 20 11 in 
Kunar, :Ingarhar, I.aglun:ln, ::Ind uri.-.I.1I1 Provinc~. Its fir:o.l cOlllnl::lnding officer W~IS ~IAJ 
Clint lianna , TFMW Civil Affairs $-9. The mis,sinn of the NnCC W~IS to deny insurgent" :lCCCSS 
to hUIll:1I1 and financi~1I L":lpil:ll dcriv(xl from the cxploil:l lion of natur:.11 resources. Bader and 
Dougbs were the co-team Ic:tdcr!oi of the cell throughollt th l: durJlion or il~ cxi:-;h.:ncl! and 
wcre rc:-;pon:-;iblc for mission implementation and wf.-lk'al opcmtions. 
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is a complex web involving il1teracliol1s of the Ajghan govem-
mellI, insurgent orgal7izatiolls, allel local communities. FOllrth, 
smuggling dislllfJlion by illte1'llalional coalilion forces alienates 
the local papulalioll and call be call lite/productive. FiJib, natural 
forest ecosystems ill Ajgballistall are experiencillg accelerated dis-
t/trbance from timber ha/vest since insurgents began taking over 
tbe iIIega/ 1i1llber trade. 
KEYI'(IORDS Cedrus deodara, illegal logging, northwestern 
Himalaya 
INTHODucnON 
The academic, militalY, and international development commUnlues have 
long recognized the linkage between the exploitation of natural resources 
and generation of revenue by insurgent and criminal organizations (I.e Billon 
2001). Indeed, the U.S. government has developed programming specifica lly 
to address these issues in its development policies under The U.S . Agency for 
International Development (USAID, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). In the academic 
literature, however, litlie has been written that describes, in operational 
detail , the activities of an insurgent-based resource extraction syndicate. 
This allicie presents a case study drawn from the unclassified 
experiences of the Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell (NRCC) in 
Afghanistan. The NRCC was a jOint militaly/civilian unit thm was tasked 
with denying insurgents access to human and financial capital derived 
from the exploitation of natural resources in eastern Afghanistan. Timber 
is the primary resource addressed in this case study. It is hoped that this 
anicle, through its detailed descril tion of how an illegal timber network 
operates, with its linkages to traditional community dynamiCS, corrupt gov-
ernment offi cials, criminal canels and insurgent organizations, will provide a 
broader understanding for international institutions battling illegal resource 
exploitation. 
Studies by the Wildlife Conservation Society under USAID funding con-
firm that nonheastern Afghanistan is the most heavily forested region in the 
country (De latrre & Rahmani, 2007). The forest of eastern Afghanistan con-
sists of two prim~lIy forest types; a broad leaf forest of evergreen oak, and 
a high elevation con ifer forest (Delatlre & Rahmani, 2007). NRCC found it 
essential, when evaluating the ut ilization of forests and the impact upon the 
delivery of ecological services and economic benefits, to address each of the 
two forests as distinctly different in their role within Afghan society (NRCC, 
2010). The involvement of organized crime, corrupt Afghan government 
officials, and insurgents, as well as the networks that suppOI1 them, are 
markedl}' different for the oak forest verses the con ifer forest type. 
1;'111001' E:\ploitatiolf mul Counterinsurgellcy Operatiolls ill Kmwr 331 
[n eastern Afghanistan , the average resident is most dependent upon the 
":lk forest, and it is the oak ecosystem that has been most extensively altered 
by anthropogenic disturbance. The con ifer forests are Ihe more commerCially 
\ liuable forests and are controlled by illega l smuggling networks. 
METHODS 
This article is a "case study" approach to resea rch, and employs a systematic 
,"mpling effolt to obtain biophys ic~1i dma on the conifer forest component 
of selected parts of Kunar Province. It also includes interviews and first hand 
observations. The authors acknowledge Significant deficiencies with respect 
to formal hypotheses testing and scientific sampling protocols. These short-
falls were necessitated by the exigencies of combat and the attendant lack of 
control , access, and lime. Initially, the autho rs had no imention of produc-
II1g a document such as this, Their resea rch was deSigned to produce policy 
recommendations for rea l-lime execUlion within a fluid and contested battle 
SI In. As such, the rigor and methodology applied was solely to ascertain 
L " ulld truth and provide United States mil ilalY commanders wilh reasonable 
I die' recommenda tions. Kunar Province has been and renla ins one of the 
," ht vio lenl and contested provinces within Afghanistan making traditiona l 
, .. . ch methods all but impossible. Despite Ihese limitations, the effort and 
", '<I >cIs used were more intense :lI1d systematic than any previous attempt 
'uri, J the current Afghanistan War which began in 2001. 
he information necessa lY for this case study included a reconnais-
,I'< . of timber resources and a tracking of the harvest and flow of wood 
II \4 C(S and human IransacLions involved in those activities. Overall , the 
data oblained by the NRCC were the products of: (a) low-level , helicopter 
over-flights (approximately 200 m above tree lOp) in the form o f parallel 
n ight-lines thai were typically 1-2 km "palt with high resolut ion photographs 
taken approximately every 100-200 m once over the target area; (b) dis-
mounted foot patrols with U.S. mi litary personnel to obtain g round truth and 
co llection of additional observation data; (c) use of imagery from unmanned 
aeria l vehicles (UAVs); (d) interviews ",ilh timber exploitation operators; and 
(e) debriefs w ilh U.S. Army soldiers operming out of combat outposts (COPs) 
in areas o f foresl cover. 
Approximately 2,000 helicopter-based photographs were [;Iken along 
a forest belt in Kunar Province during over flights of the Chapa Dara, 
Pech, Chowkay, Nafllng, Nur G:lI, and Asadabad districts encompaSSing the 
Korengal, Narang, Pech, Shut yak and other smaller valleys (See Figu re 1). 
Change in forest cover was determined by comparing transects flown in 
2010 and 2011 . 
NRCC generated an eSlimate of the extent and distribution of conifer for-
est cover in Kunar through the syntheSiS of elata from its helicopter transects, 
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FIGURE 1 Valleys and (listricls of Kunar Provin<..:c, Afghanistan (Sollrcc:http:/ /www. 
undcrstandingwar,org/silcs/dcfauJI/nlcs/KlinarNurbwn_Largccpy.jpg) (color flgufe <lvailablc 
online). 
UAV photos, groundbased observations, and topographical map-derived 
approximations of suitable habitat. Habitat su itabil ity was determined to 
exist in bands most likely between the elevations of 2,000 and 3,000 m, on 
slopes with northerly or easterly aspects, and w ithin the monsoon influenced 
snow-belt parallel w ith the Pak istan border. 
The authors based much of their initial findings from debriefings with a 
prominent smuggler w ho worked w ith the NRCC as a confidentia l informant. 
This informant's deta iled and granular reconstructions regarding operations 
were [hen testcd by NIlCC th rough direct fi eld inspection and interviews 
with other parties during U.S. Army patrols in w hich NRCC participated. 
Timber smuggling descri ptions wcre also developed from conversations with 
Afghan chanered natural resource-oriented non-governmental organiza tions 
j 
... 
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(NGOs), physical inspection of wood processing facilities by NRCC, and 
.tflcr-action reviews with U.S. and allied soldiers. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Forests of Kunar Province 
Oak trees feed livestock as farmers lop the branches and leaves for fod-
.kr. Oak and juniper heat homes in ci ty and countryside alikc. Oak is 
rhe fuel for cooking food at the family hearth. Many Afghans refer to this 
forest as the "forest of life" because without these trees, life as it is prac-
ticed in much of the area would be impossible (Waldman, 2007). The 
primary species observed by NRCC in this forest bell are Quercus ba/oot 
(baloot) and Quercus dilatata (brown oak). Located at an elevation band of 
1,200-2,500 m, the mixed oak forests are in closest proximity to human set-
tlement and are under continuous pressure. NRCC observations concluded 
that the baloot oak fo rest experienced the greatest leve l of harvest and the 
lowest level of regeneration due to livestock grazing, farmland conversion, 
and repeated cutting. Its vulnerability derives from the demand for it in every-
day subsistence use and the relative ease of 'lccess for exploitation that its 
I, ,wer elevation permits. Moreover, decades of continuous warfare has under-
llIined indigenous knowledge of sustainable foresllY practices (NRCC, 2010). 
I hadani and Ashton (995) observed a similar lack of effective regeneration 
Within the banj oak (Quercus leucotrichophora) belt o f the central Himalayan 
~ ,,,unlains which was attributable to excessive grazing, fuelwood harvest, 
nd lopping. However, in their study, they found that moderate disturbance 
ic-"els, which opened canopy cover, resulted in adequate oak regeneration. 
II is assumed that the oak forest belt in Afgh,ooistan may respond Similarly. 
Their findings may prove instru ct ive for Afghanistan when hostilities subside 
to the point to which management regimes can be re-established. 
The majority of oak fuelwood harvesters are velY small enterprises that 
provide wood to loca l villages or individual fanners. In genen\i, oak halvest 
is either for a domestic Afghan market or for subsistence. A few contractors 
do operate fuelwood transpol1 systems that provide for the more lucrative 
markets in Kabul and other large cities (NRCC, 2010). 
Among the limited number of networks that specialize in the fuelwood 
market for Kabul, Jalalabad, and other major cit ies, the operators usually 
pay a group of vi llage leaders to halvest a nearby mountainSide. Most often 
oak fuelwood is cut by customalY management schemes in which villages 
control access and volume for extraction. Local communities keep compering 
villagers away from "their mountain" (NRCC, 20] 0). Even rhough the harvest 
of oak is extensive, and oak deforestation is significanr, insurgenr linked 
networks did not get involved in the fuelwood trade prior to 201 J because 
rhe 1ll0netalY value was too low to warntnt the investment (NRCC, 20]] a) . 
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Clear-cutting continues to be the most p revalent form of harvest in 
the oak forest observed by the NRCC. This observation seems to be logi-
ca l because of the low capitalization of the fuelwood industry. Almost all 
harvesting is accompl ished by hand with an axe or buck saw. As a conse-
quence it is only natura l that a fuelwood cutter would want to cut as many 
trees in close proximity to one another as possible to ensure time, effort, and 
tra nsport effi ciency. 
It is interesting to note that small scale localized conflict among villages 
tends to be more prevalent over oa k harvest than over commercia l conifers. 
This may stem from the fact that operators are p robably sma ll enough, and 
have parity with one another, such that no one vi llage or entity can create 
a cartel or local mo nopoly. In addit ion, it is likely that many individual 
villages lack the capacity to aggreSSively confront the well-organized criminal 
syndicates or insurgent forces for the more lucrative conifer timber resource. 
NRCC found the current oak harvest industty to be a decentra lized 
race to exploitation and ruin. Even stumps and large belowground roots 
are removed for the wood conta ined. Other anthropogenic distu rbances 
include intensive overgrazing by goats and sheep of the understory, inhibit-
ing regeneration. Deforestation, and the attendant soil erosion, water quality 
degradation, floods, and drought, haunts the lower reaches of the mounta ins 
as a result of the widespread exploitation of the oa k forest belt. 
Commercial timber harvest is concentrated in the conifer forest ecosys-
tem located in an elevation band of 2,000--3,000 m with some species 
ranging to 3,300 m (Delatlre & Hahmani , 2007). This forest type is dom-
inated by cedar (Cedrus cieociara), spruce (Picea smithiana) , pine (Pinus 
wallichiana), fir (A bies sjJeclabilis), juniper (/un ijJel1ts excelsa), and high 
elevation oak (Quercus semecaJpijolia) . In add ition, deciduous Belllia u/ilis, 
and POjJulus cilia les contribute Sign ifica nt canopy cover near tree line . Pine, 
cedar, and spruce form a co-domi nant stratum readling heights of 25-35 m 
in an open canopy forest with a primarily grass/shrub understory (Ahmed, 
Shahid Shaukat, & Faheem Siddiq ui, 2011). NRCC found few examples of 
understory regeneration. Log ri ng counting by the NRCC determined that 
most trees, in areas where active harvest was occurring, were aged between 
125-160 years. Only a few logs were found to have rings indicating an 
age less than 100 years or in excess of 200 yea rs. NRCC tree ring count-
ing was limited to specimens located in mills encountered while on foot 
patrol. No actual coring of standing trees was possible. However, these data 
may indicate the o ptimum sized tree for processing and smuggling. 
NHCC generated an estimate of the extent and distribution of conifer 
forest cover in Kunar. It did so synthes izing data from helicopter transect 
lines, UAV photos, ground-based patrol observations, and topographica l 
map-derived approximations of suitable fo rest habitat. Based on this pro-
cess, NHCC estimated that the area assessed contained roughly 1,600 km' of 
conifer forest as of July 2010. NHCC's 2010 estimate of conifer forest cover 
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was in marked conn'ast to the estimate generated by a USAID contractor in 
2009 (NRCC, 2010). The USAID conm,ctor stated that only 189 km 2 of con ifer 
forest remained in all of Kunar. NllCC believed that not only was the contrac-
tor assel1ion inaccurate, but that it was most likely a product of fabrication, 
and promptly reponed its concerns to both Task Force Mountain Warrior 
and USAID. Though the USAID contractor report was consistent with a prior 
United Narions Environmenta l Program study (United Narions Environment 
Programme, 2003), the most Scient ifi ca lly robust investigation regarding tim-
ber harvest in the eastern Afghan fo rests (prior to the NRCC investigation), 
was conducted by Wildlife Conservat ion Society, and appears to substan-
tiate the NRCC findings while questioning the United Nations figures on 
deforestat ion (Delattre & Rahmani , 2007). 
Deodar cedar (Cec/ms deodar a) is by far the most sought after species 
by clandestine networks and is expolled as cants to Pakistan (NRCC, 2010, 
~() I I a). Eventua lly the product is moved through Karachi to buyers around 
the world. Timber networks require the involvement of the Afghan gav-
el1ment, loca l warlords, load communities, insurgent groups, and Pakistani 
of flcials (NRCC, 2010). In order to ingratiate themselves in local communi-
tlC.'. smugglers tend to provide a small volume of timber to local Vi llages free 
I .I charge. With th is form o f informal tax , Villagers find additional benefits to 
('l )()peration with syndicates 
Nc'!work Structure and Operation 
Tlte ancient nature of the forest trade permeates every aspect of society in 
Kunar and does not rely upon modern trappings. For exam ple, the unit of 
length is defined by two fists connected at the poim o f o utstretched thumbs. 
Volume is measured as one set of hands, by one set of hands, by one set of 
hands. The minimum cant size is a volume defined as fOUf standard unit.". 
Thus, a typical wood cant measures 8 length units by J unit by 'l', units for 
a to ta l volume of 4 cubic units (a cant is apprOXimately 0.11 01' , measuring 
roughly 2.4 01 by 0.30 m by 0.15 01). Timber eXlra ction is a labor intens ive 
process that involves mcn working Wilh chain saws, manua l skidding of logs 
along corduroy trails to tempora,y mill stat ions, transpolt of cants by donkey 
train, and eventual border crossings and load ing onto trucks to Pakistan 
destinations. It is a system steeped in tradilion, and it successfully cuts across 
tribal affiliations. Highly formalized, yet unofficial systems also exist for the 
accounting o f money, loans, and sccuri ty. Timber networks use [he Pakistan 
rupee (PKR) as the exclusive cu rrency of the smuggling business. 
From the stan of NRCC monitoring operations in February 2010, until 
November 2010, logging crews rypically looked for the biggest and straight-
est lrees with lhe fewest branches to cut. They tended to avoid cutling small 
trees because it is not wonh the effolt , for [hey wou ld nor be paid if a log 
was less than 1 ca nt in size. Slands of trees, generally J to 3 jeribs (0.2 to 
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0.8 ha), are harvested in de facto group selection cuts. This permits potential 
regeneration by natural seed rain from the surrounding trees (typically pine 
and spruce) as the local stand of cedar is liquidated. The logged area is large 
enough to allow direct sunlight at the soil surface and the logging activity 
provides adequate scarification of the ground to create sufficiem exposed 
mineral soi l to facilitate germination. Soil erosion is kept low due to the rela-
tively small size of the group selection cuts. However, a series of events put 
into motion a fundamemal change in illega l harvesting practices. Eventually, 
large-scale clear-cuts, erosion, and Olher significant ecological dislurbances 
began in January 2011 and continues th roughout the region. 
Prior to late 2010, smuggling involved a number of actors as the 
cants moved from Kunar forests to Pakistan . These panicipants included: 
(a) landowner; (b) smugglers; (c) accountants; (d) contractors; (e) security 
teams; (f) wood depOl managers; (g) logging crews; and (h) village labor. 
The concept of land ownership can be malleable in rural Afghanistan, 
and it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the complex concept 
and its multifarious use. Nevenheless, it appears that the term "landowner" is 
recent and has come to describe people or entities with enforceable claims 
to a panicular area that was once considered the propeny of the king or 
the government. A village will "own" a tract o f land o r have rights to its 
use by vinue of custom, but will hold no lega ll y identifiable or defendable 
claim. The same holds true for individual families. This opens the land up for 
exploitation by people or groups wilh the power to enforce their cla ims. The 
introduction of land redistribution under the communist government, oHen 
as a reward for po litical cooperation, further complicated the issue. These 
policies have led in pan to the present condition where multiple claims for 
land exist, based on proximity, ethnicity, or verbal agreements. 
The smuggler network creates the environment within which the trade 
operates. Smugglers hire the loca l labor to physically move the timber. h is 
the network that establishes connections, negotiatcs bribes, provides secu-
rity, and offers a system of agreed upon conditions and processes. A network 
can accomplish this because it is a social and criminal construct, dominated 
and enabled by loca l warlords, ~Ind is intenwined with, yet distinct from, 
both the Afghan government and the insurgency. The network constitutes a 
parallel and ubiquitous shadow economy that informs and influences most 
aspects of life in Kunar. 
A contractor provides the initial money to purchase timber from a forest 
landowner and assumes the risk of investment in exchange for the potential 
to make a p rofi t by selling the wood once it has been transpolted . He can 
either be an employee of a vcltically integrated network, or, he can be an 
independent business man who interacts with a network in order to move 
the timber f,lbm the landowner's location to Pakistan. 
The accountant is the individual upon whom all depend to keep track of 
costs, timber, and obligations . Various accoumants are involved at different 
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stages of the operation, from where the trees are logged , transported, and 
l'\,cntually sold. 
A typical transaction starts with a contractor making arrangements with 
landowner for the timber.Once arrangemcnts havc been made with the 
Londowner, the contractor hires crews of about three men per crew to do 
, l' logging. A crew with a chainsaw can usua lly clear two jeribs (0.4 ha) of 
·rest per day, To support the logg ing crews, the contractor usually provides 
'"in saws and orher equ ipment and pays the men from his own funds. Both 
t'll' contractor and the landowner inspect the logs and agree to a price after 
the harvesting has been completed. 
After the logs have been canted and are ready for transport, the network 
becomes involved. A smuggling crew provides for the physical transport of 
the wood and security. Security can take the form of armed men who accom-
pany the wood or a standing force separate from the transport, to ensure 
retribution if the network is interfered with , The most common approach 
is the latter, as the network is usually secure enough that persistent armed 
security is unnecessaly. Wood and guns seldom travel together. However, 
disputes between networks do occasiona lly flare up and can escalate into 
, "er hostilities. The prim,,,y networks can field severa l hundred armed 
TS mnel if need be, 
Wood cants are then stored along the route at depots ca lled hadas 
stcd by the smuggler and protected by network assets. /-lac/a operators 
aid a uniform 40 PKR (Pak istan rupee) per wood cant. The price is the 
11", rega rdless of how long the wood remains stored at the bada. Wood 
tay at a bada for as long as two years before being moved. There is a 
"" ')ond among rhe netwo rk, contractor, and bada operator that allows for 
'" ' " ayments, lost wood, etc, Loca l villagers often obtain wood free from 
".' ada in order for the hac/a to remain SOCially accepted. The contractor 
,,,ltkrstands this and does not demand payment for cants that are given for 
usc in the village. 
Throughout the process of phYSically moving the illega l timber to 
the Afghanis(;l n border with Pakistan, there is an accountant present. This 
accountant may be the smuggler's accou ntant, who accO/llpanies the prod-
uct between the badas, or it may be the bada accountant, or it may be 
the contractor's accountant ensuring enforcement of the origina l tenllS. The 
accountants handle the actual I"rJl1sactions, becluse (he other operators in 
the chain are frequently ill iterate and thus unable to interpret the necessary 
ledgers and associated documents. This system also provides the smugglers 
and contractors w irh ~,n ~Idded layer o f security, as neither pany is ever in 
physica l contact wi th the illicit wood on the smuggling routes. 
The accountant serves on " month ly retainer. He also usually receives 
a portion of the proceeds depending upon the size of the job, the level of 
expertise required, the duration of the project, and the amount harvested. 
An accountant can only have one client at a time. While it is the network 
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which distributes payments to the various government officia ls, competing 
war lords, and insurgents, the prices and arrangements are typica lly arrived 
at by negotiation between the network and contractors through the accoun-
tants. The accountant makes deals for the labor, makes su re the crews are 
paid and fed , and helps arrange prices at the end market. The accountant also 
makes contact with the other accountants down range with in the chain . Each 
contractor will typically have three accountants: one for harvest operations, 
one for transpolt, and o ne for marketing. 
The wood cants are branded to represent a specific contract between 
a contractor and tJ,e network. A paIticu lar brand is reused only if the fi rst 
contract is fulfilled and a sufficient period of time has elapsed so as to avoid 
confusion. Brands are modified slightly with the same general design for ease 
of identification to indicate the contractor or network. It is this method by 
wh ich the contractor, network, and land owner can keep track of propeny 
in the depots and to the agreed upon terms. 
Previously, it was thought that the brand represented either a "tax" 
rece ipt showing that a palticular strongman had been paid to permit passage, 
or that it represented either a pa.ticular contractor or a specific landowner. 
Compounding tJ,e complex ity is the fact that small operations often cannot 
use a single network, and multiple contracts are needed to move each cant. 
Thus, a single piece of wood can have up to three different brands (though 
that would indicate a series of weak contractors witJlin a network). 
After an undete rmined period of time, the smuggler returns to retrieve 
the timber, which is broken up into smaller bundles and loaded onto don-
keys for the journey into the mounmins along the Pakistani border. Wh ile the 
smuggler manages the logistics behind the physical transport of the timber, 
the contractor makes his way to Peshawar via Jalalabad. In Peshawar, me 
contractor arranges for letters of transit provided by Pakistani government 
officials, which he then hands over to a Pakistani driver/contact. There is 
no fulther interference in the trade on the palt of Pakistani offi cials once 
the initial papers have been acquired in Peshawar. Also, as a general rule, 
the Pakistani Taliban do not interfere with timber expolts from Afghanistan. 
During the entire process, the contractor is never in physical proximity to 
the actual timber once in transit. 
The contractor must arrange for a permit to impolt the wood into 
Pakistan. This is usually accomplished through a Pakistani pe rmit broker 
that bundles the permits in quantities of 150 cants for each permit. The per-
mit broker, with whom the conrractor inreracts, is the go-between at this 
stage with the Pakistan government. It is unclea r whether these officials 
represenr Pakistani government policy or are s imply members of a criminal 
conspiracy. It is equally unclear as to which agency these officia ls ultimately 
repolt . Whatever their origin, the letters of transit are easily procured and 
once acquired, the load of timber waiting at the border becomes a legal 
commodity within the confines of Pakistan. At this stage the wood benefits 
the Pakistani government through the normal lawful tax structure . 
• ------------~-----------------------
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After the wood arrives sa fely in Pakistan , the contractor arranges " price 
for the wood with a buyer. Finall y, the contractor pays the landowner for 
wood sold at an agreed price; and the contractor keeps the rest. While 
in Pakisran, timber movement takes place in areas Wilh at least nominal 
government control , and the trade is facilitated by governm ent o fficials. The 
documents sold in Peshawar by brokers are absolutely necessary for the 
unhindered movement of timber within Pakistan. The authors are aware of 
only one organization within the Pakistani government with the wherewit hal 
to influence timber wtde in this chamic region, and that is the D irectorate 
for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). 
In summ~tJy , the stronger the contractor the more steps the contractor 
performs himself. A strong contraclOr, working w ithin a powerful network, 
can afford the ability 10 be the sole source of the wood from the moment 
it is cut, 10 when it is sold in Pakistan. Weaker COnlraClOrs must sell the 
wood to a subsequent contractor who then takcs possession of the cant and 
paints his contract brand over the other contract brand. The less powerfu l 
contraclOrs must sell out some steps, particularly the transit and the selling 
in Pakistan. If these smaller contractors do nm cooperate with established 
networks, their w ork crews may be kidnapped for ransom. 
Network Routes 
There are three principal routes in Kunar by which wood is moved to 
Pakistan. These routes move timber through the Shaunkrai, I3inshai, and 
Nawa passes. Prior 10 this investigation, it was be lieved that illicit timber was 
smuggled via a complex web o f multiple trail routes so as to avoid detection 
and that the entire trade was controlled by insurgent groups. This was found 
to be inaccu rate on both c unts prior to late 2010. The insti tut ionalization of 
timber smuggl ing had reached a point of acceptance by the end of 2009 that 
it w as no longer necessa ty to engage in furti ve movement. 
The most heavily used route was that controlled by Haji Jan Daad. 
Timber commonly moves through the Barabat check point where a 1011 is 
paid. The timber is then smuggled to Pakistan via the Shaunkrai Pass in 
southern Kunar. 
The most desirable rou te for contraclOrs, though nm necessarily the 
most freq uently used, is in northern Kunar in an area formerly controlled 
by Malik Zarin, before his assassina tion. This network transits through the 
Binshai Pass. Zarin 's network was most preferred because it provided bctter 
security, prOVided more celtainty in fee price, and ensured greater likelihood 
of the product arriving in Pakistan quickly. 
A third route traverses Marawara and Sarkani districts through the Nawa 
pass. This network is utilized primarily by smaller contractors and severa l 
insurgent affiliated networks. 
Once the wood arrives on the Pakistan side, it is destined 10 Pinde, 
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States (the primary destinations being located within the UA E of Dubai and 
Ras al-K haimah). NRCC has been able to successfully bid on clandestine 
lnternet auctions for Afghan cedar and arrange shipment from compan ies 
opemting out of Karachi. Thus, the Kamchi expediters that Afghan smug-
glers have alluded to have been confirmed as an integral component of the 
internationalizat io n of the cedar tmde from Afghan istan. 
The benefits of a powerful network are that the organization enforces 
norms of behavior, ensures stability and certainty, and provides security 
and contacts . Otherwise, there is considerable strife among competing 
contractors that has nOlhing to do with political or ideologica l conflict. 
Whoever keeps the timber industry working, "have Ihe people's hearls ... 
and their guns." 
Network Economics 
The wages paid to the various actors (not counting contractors, accountants, 
and landowners) within the trade appear fairly consistent, regardless of the 
network. Fees charged by the network, hada, and loggers are fixed, regard-
less of (he species of wood transpolled or its value on the Pakistan market. 
Loggers are paid 350 PKR for e:,ch cant of wood (this is roughly 
$33 m-3 at an exchange rate of 95 rupees to the dollar). The payment is 
made to the crew as a group to be divided among its members. Not only 
is the payment the same regardless of the species of timber, it is made 
regardless of wood quality (in terms of knots, blemishes, etc.). However, 
if there are too many imperfections in the cam, then the entire piece is 
rejected and no payment made. 
Security members receive between 10,000-12,000 I'KR ($116 U.S.) per 
month. Most if nOl all security are hired from local villages. Networks rou-
tinely use and pay for the same men from villages that are trusted. Those 
involved in the physical tmnspoll of the wood on behalf of the network 
are paid by the contractor at about 100 to 150 PKR per cant transported 
($12 m- 3), depending upon the length of time the wood is in their respon-
Sibility. As mentioned previously, the wood depot operators tend to receive 
about 40 PKR per cant ($4 m-3). 
The different routes tend to have different "fees" associated with pas-
sage. When working with a network, a contmctor need only make one 
payment. All bribes and arrangements are consequently addressed by the 
network and the contractor is not engaged. The contract mark (timber 
bmnd), announces the arrangement to all involved thereby immunizing the 
contmctor from having to pay additiona l fees from free lanCing corrupt 
officials, criminal enterprises, and insurgents. 
When under his command, the Zarin network charged approximately 
3500 I'Kll for a cant of wood ($335 m- 3) . The southern Daad network 
charged fees of al out 2250 PKR for an equal amount of wood ($215 m- 3) . 
a--------______________________ ~d 
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The more centrally locared Nawa Pass route, which offers less success in 
moving cants, averaged about 2,500 PKIl for the sa me volume o f timber 
($260 m- J). 
Permi ts issued in Pakistan to lega li ze the timber are sold to the con-
tractor for about 75,000 PKIl per bundle of ]50 cants. This represenrs an 
additional fee o f apprOXimately $47 m- 5 The permit broker pays a price o f 
about 50,000 PKIl ($32m- ;) to the Pakistani o fficial and keeps Ihe remainder. 
In Pakistan, Deodar cedar can be sold by the conlractor for between 
11 ,000 PKIl for a cant if the wood is of good or excellent quality. Lower 
quality cedar is sold for 8,000 PKR Thi translates to jlbour an average price 
o f $900 m- j for cedar, which is considerably higher than Ihe $660 111- 3 w hich 
can be obta ined in the Afghanistan's domestic markets ( NIlCC, 2010). Little 
or no pine or spruce is exportecl to Pakistan. As was mentioned earlier, the 
logger, smuggler, wood depot operators, permit brokers, and networks are 
all pa id by the cant , regardless o f wood species; consequently, it wou ld 
make little sense to ;lllempt to smuggle Ihese lower value species. 
Befo re it was criminal ized in 2006, about 50% of the southern Kunar 
timber harvest was sold internally within Afghanistan. Today, more than 95% 
of all harvest is expo'ted to Pakistan. This figure is consistent with other 
research on the timber trade (Wingard, Karlstener, Simms, & Johnson, 2008). 
As a result o f the comingling inAuences o f culture, traclition, and eco-
nomic necessity, loca l communities are acti ve and Will ing participants in the 
commercial timber trade. The networks are major employers in the commu-
nity for security, labor (cutting ancl smuggling), donkey handling, and wood 
depots. Nelworks, through Ihe bacia operator, supply needed construction 
materials to the community. Fuelwood, harvested on behalf of the Village by 
logging crews associated with networks, provide a reliable supply for hearing 
and cooking fuel that wou ld otherwise be an arduous unde,taking by hane!. 
Tradilionally, these communilies have always been timber dependent. 
As ~, Singular source of high quality wood in an area where there is a deanh 
o f forcst, Kunar residents and Nuristanis built a tradition o f logging and wood 
work ing. The networks serve 10 re-enforce self-image and cultural norms of 
hardy and independent woodsmen. Effons to shut down the timber trade 
are viewed as economica lly threatening and a predatory attack by a distant 
government, which in turn on ly further undermines the au thority of the state. 
Corruption and the Timber Trade 
During the civil war and the subsequent Taliban rule , much of the timber 
trade was internationalized, denying loca l communities access to pro fit from 
the business. It was at this time that the ral e o f logging increased sign ificamly. 
It is suspected, but not confirmed, that the Taliban-controlled government 
(J 996-2001) attempted to harvest large areas of forest in o rcler to generale 
quick influxes of hard currency. As a result o f ties to Pakistan during the civil 
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war, it seems that the Taliban turned to Pakistani associates as the primary 
coordinators of timber trade. Indeed, loca l reporting has indicated that log-
ging crews at that time were composed primarily of Pakistani labor. Power of 
local communities to control the forest resources in their vicin ity was greatly 
diminished by Taliban rule. 
With the ouster of the Taliban govern ment by Coalition Forces, the 
timber trade passed to local wa rlords and the industry began ro consoli-
date by a variety of means, including violence. The timber industry, though 
banned by mulLiple legal instru ments, thrived after the Taliban with quasi-
government recognition through various corrupt government officia ls and 
Afghan National Security Forces. 
Thus, the logging prohibition, in place from 2006 until 2011, criminal-
ized a necessity, forcing villagers inro a system of corruption (Ministry of 
Agriculture , Irrigation and Livestock IMAIL!, 2006, p. 7) . The situation created 
a power imbalance whereby average Vill agers to lerated and pa rticipated in 
criminal syndicates in order ro have access ro a commodity without which 
the people could not survive. The ban and its selective enforcement served 
to prevent market e ntry by new actors and thereby re-enforced the regional 
monopolies enjoyed by the networks and warlords. 
The NRCC investiga tion found that prior to late 2010, the primary tim-
ber smuggling networks were dominated by local warlords that bribed and 
coe rced the Afghan government security apparatus and civil ia n govern-
ment. Afghan government-affili ated individuals and institutions permeated 
every aspect of the smuggling trade as elements subjuga ted ro the networks. 
Afghan government elements and the networks were inextricably intertwined 
in the timber trade. Acti ve interdiction, when carried out by Coa li tion Forces, 
served only to alienate both the loca l populace and Afghan government 
offi cials. 
Timber Explo itatio n and the Insurgency 
The sa lient feature of the timber trade as it was practiced in Kunar between 
2002 and 2010, was that the primary acrors were affiliated with warlords and 
corrupt government offi cials rarher than insurgent organizations. This is not 
ro say that there was nor signifi cant involvement by insurgent elements. The 
interesting factor was that the smuggling enterprise demanded cooperation 
among all the components of Kunar society-including competing political, 
theologica l, and triba l groups. The success of the timber smuggling net-
works created a SOI1 of enforced collaboration, transcending friction points 
and enabling tribal and politically antagonistic entities to cooperate. Thus, 
insurgent organizat ions freely coordinated with corrupt Afghan government 
officia ls, loca l warlords, village elde rs, and Pakistan gove rnment intelligence 
services in or er to ga in revenue from harvesting timber. 
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In Kunar, there was one region that exhibited the rare dominance of 
insurgellls in the timber business. This was the Narang-Shulyak Valleys 
complex. Within the Narang Valley, insurgents created their own verti-
Lil ly integrated timber explo itation and expolt network. This was possible 
lJecause of the circumstance that the foresl landowners and comractors in 
Ihl! va lley were insurgent officers. In addilion, loca l community support for 
insurgent activities was quite high in both the Narang and Shuryak va lleys. 
As a consequence, insurgent operators w ere able to monopolize the har-
vest and transport of Ihe lucrative timber smuggling trade within this area. 
Taken as a whole, wherher directly in contro l or acting as collaborators, the 
NHCC estimared lhat, prior to Ihe end of 2010, the insurgent share in timber 
revenues did nOI exceed 20% of Ihe total trade in Kunal'. 
Shi ft in Smuggling Operations to the Insurgency 
CommenCing in November 2010 however, rhe NRCC observed insurgent 
roles grow rapidly. Accompanying the change in insurgent influence was 
~l r~l pid acceleration of clear-cut harvest ing on a massive scale, in contrast to 
viollsly observed pracrices. It is believed that the insurgent effort to dom-
'Ite the limber trade in Kunar began as ~I deliberate operation to liquidate 
\ iluable forests in order to obtain revenue to procure ordnance, men, and 
,'i her supplies in alllicipation of the 20 11 and 2m 2 fighting seasons. 
A number of factors contributed to crea ting the cond itions necessary to 
.il",w Ihis change to occur. These factors were: Ca) the Afghan government 
ll:lI1gedlhe national timber law, suspending Ihe timber sa le ban for stock-
piled wood, thus creating a lega l domestic timber market fo r the first time 
>lI1ce 2006; Cb) low snowfa ll in ea rly and mid-winter permitted movement 
in forested areas and access through mo untain passes berween Pakistan and 
Afghanistan that were normally closed at thai lime; Cc) the insurgent ass~l ssi­
nation of Malik Zarin and the declining influence of Haj i Jan Daad; and Cd) 
need by insurgent clements to replenish o rdnance se ized or destroyed by 
successful coa lilion operat ions. 
According to the U.S. Department of State, the Afghan government 
issued Decree 5306 which created a palt ial li fting of the ban on the sa le 
o f timber in certain pans o f Afghanistan, including all of Kunar Province. 
The decree allowed Ihe sa le of timber Ihat had been cut prior to 2006, had 
been inventoried, and was held in government inspected stockpiles CN RCC, 
201 1 a). Under the decree, export of Afghan wood to foreign states was 
still prohibiled. The measure was originally intended to last six mOl1lhs, bUI 
was later extended through 201 1. The change in law resulted in the desired 
effect of drawing down the timber stockpile prior to the loss of thal w ood 
through weal hering, fire, and other d;lmaging exposures, as well as crear ing 
an important source of governmenl revenue. 
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However, accord ing to Afghan sources involved in timber trade, the 
decree sparked increased illegal logging and timber exports under the sub-
terfuge of the legal framework. In the course of the NRCC investigation, all 
participants in smuggling expressed a consistent observation that the Afghan 
government lacked both the capacity and the will to exercise effective mon-
itoring, taxation, and comrol of the movement of wood within irs borders 
and to ensure conformance with the provisions of the decree. 
lnterestingly, with the legalization of wood and the tax imposed, the 
price for cedar in domestic Afghan markets such as jalalabad increased 
between july 2010 and March 2011, from $680 to $748 m-'< based upon 
prices as determined from a survey of local markets (NRCC, 201 1a). The rise 
in price may suggest that rar from ameliorating the lumber shortage in com-
munities, the timber law may have increased the demand and ma rket for all 
wood products. A similar increase was observed for domestic sales of pine, 
spruce and poplar. 
Commensurate with the incentive for increased illegal logging, made 
possible by the decree and lack of government enforcement, the impact of 
low snow accumulation above 2,000 m in the mountains during early and 
mid-winter allowed for forest harvest and related movement to continue and 
enabled transit of mountain passes by donkey into February 2011, when 
heavy snows finally blanketed the Province. Mild weather extending the 
work season coincided with the insurgem need for resupply, which may 
have contributed to insurgent elements capitalizing on the situation to se ize 
and control timber operations. 
The abil ity of insurgent actors to increase involvement in timber harvest 
and trade since November 2010 has been concurrent with a decline in com-
mand and control over timber nctworks by both Malik Zarin , in northern 
Kunar, and Haji jan Daad in the southcrn portion of the Province. The orig-
inal reasons for the withdrawal of Zarin and Daad from active control are 
not well understood , and may be a combination of various factors including 
a desire to invest financial assets into different enterprises, intimidation by 
insurgents as they moved into remote areas during Coalition force realign-
ment in 2010, or pressures from other competing criminal timber smuggl ing 
networks. FollOWing Zarin's assassination, his network diSintegrated, with 
parts being taken over and absorbed into organizations more closely allied 
with insurgent elements associated with Pakistani entities. 
As further evidence of a major shift in control, the NRCC was able 
to confirm changes in the infrastructure supporting the transport of wood 
through central and southern Kunar. These cha nges included shifts in the 
locations of badas, donkey corrals, and I"ddica l changes in movement pat-
terns. NRCC documented initial violent resistance by local communities to 
insurgent atlempts to usurp the timber trade, p~lIticularly when insurgent 
groups were heav ily assisted by Pakistan-based groups. Disputes also arose 
among smaller smuggling opera tors seeking to expand their share of the 
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tfade as the est'lblished networks contracted. In areas now controlled by 
insurgent operations, clear-cutting, (resu lting in the complete remova l of 
trees regardless o f species, age, o r value), became common practice. 
[n order to obtain confirmation o f the change in harvest practices, N llCC 
conducted an additional aerial reconnaissance in January 20J 1 w ithin Kunar 
01 sites preViously inspected by the NRCC. The assessment found extensive 
clear-cuts, each exceeding 150 ha. All species o f timber were removed w ithin 
these areas. [ndeed, within one 4 km by 8 km study grid , an estimated 500 ha 
had been cleared. Many areas of stand ing forest observed in 2010 were now 
completely liqUidated. 
Interviews with loca l residents and smugglers revealed that the new 
insurgent-based networks not on ly provided lumber to villages, but also cut 
and delivered large quantities of fuelwoocl to the inhabitants. The pattern 
of 100% stem removal lends credence to the assertion. The logging crews, 
using modern chain saws and other mechanical equipment, harvest all trees, 
regardless of size. Commercial cedar is expolted to Pakistan. Pine, spruce, 
"nd fir are sawed for structural lumber. All small trees, and every oak, regard-
"'5S of species, are cut for fueiwoocl. Wood, not given to Villagers, is sold in 
urban markets throughout eastern Afghanistan <lnd Kabul. By offering local 
communities greater access to wood resources, insurgents have increased [he 
IInmediate benefit to communities at the detriment of long-term susta inabil-
"y. Even if these communities opposed the insurgent operations, they would 
I)L' powerless under the hegemony now enjoyed by the insurgent operations. 
1'1lL' degree to which lOG" labor is hired for operations, and the attendant 
<..Ish wages paid into the communities by insurgent networks, is unknown, 
as is the degree to which the labor is performed by insurgents themselves. 
Severa l stockpiles o f commercial-sized cants of fresh hewn Cedms 
deodar were found in evelY vi llage within the 2011 aerial reconnaissance. 
These stockpiles, which averaged between 10 and 40 m
' 
in volume, repre-
sent a gross va lue of between 9,000 and $36,000 per stockpile . The gross 
v<llue of all loca l stockpiles of commercial sized cants, observr:!d during the 
Single "point in time" of this one over-flight, was estim ated at approx imately 
$100,000. 
Another impol1ant change was the prevalence of construction sizedlul11-
bel' stacked at many houses in nea rly evelY Village photographed during 
the flight. In addition, extensive dumps of construction-sized timbers were 
strewn from steep hill sid s along roads and trails. It is reasonable to interpret 
this observation as an insurgent propaganda and community SUppOlt ca m-
paign . Such a widespread, nearly equ itable, and ubiquitous distribution of 
lumber to communities demonstrated far greater largesse than that practiced 
by the previous timber war lords. Indeed, the NllCC counted close to 40"10 
of buildings in observed communities having newly constructed roofs, struc-
tura l additions, and out buildings. Construction at this level of intensity is in 
ma rked contrast to that. which had been observed on previous over-flights. 
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There appears [0 be little doubt that since November 2010, a much more 
substantial flow of valuable wood has been received in local communiries in 
comparison to previous years. 
Finally, the NRCC observed considerable infrastructure investment and 
development for timber exploitation that exceeded previous observations. 
These include portable saw mills, bucking sites, roads, and corduroy skid 
trails. 
Whereas the role of illegal timber harvest and smuggling was not a 
primary source of insurgent revenue prior to the autumn of 2010, it now 
seems reasonable that by March 2011 timber liquidation had assumed a cen-
tral role in locally derived insurgent funding with the period of most rapid 
change having occurred between ea rly November 2010 and mid-January 
201 1. Internationa l demand for Afghan cedar seems to expand with the sup-
ply as the price at Karachi auctions for Cecillts cieodara remains at about 
$900 01- 3. This suggests that there is not a reduction in price as harvest 
volumes increase , thus bringing a measure of predictability for insurgent 
operations intent on using forest resources as a source of revenue. 
NRCC Efforts to Disrupt Insurgent Timber Networks 
Significant lessons have been learned by the United States in its 
counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches during the past century from the 
Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 (Linn, 1989), through the Morro War 
1903-1913 (Fulton, 2009; Arnold, 2011), Vietnam War 1965-1973 (Nagle, 
2005; Moyar, 1997), El Sa lvador Civil War 1983-1992 (Moyar 2009), and rhe 
second Iraq War 2003-2011 (Moyar, 2009; Stephenson, 2007), to the cur-
rent conflict in Afghan istan. COIN strategy and tactics necessarily involves 
a coordinated use of both lethal and socioeconomic development activities 
(Kilcullen, 2010; U.S. Army, 2007). These lessons have immediate implica-
tions for thwarting natural resources exploitation in insurgent and guerrilla 
war scenarios, including the use of timber in Afghanistan. 
Just prior to its dissolution, the NRCC developed a complex and highly 
detailed set of 30 elements for effective denial of insurgent access to 
timber, while promoting peaceful , loca l community engagement and self-
empowerment. These points can be summarized as four general principles. 
First, the bulwark of successful COIN is a strong and self-reliant com-
munity. It is the loca l village or neighborhood leadership, not national 
movement e lites or the angry foot soldiers, who are the key to deflat ing 
insurgency. Effective COIN approaches necessitates undermining insurgents 
by outcompeting them for the recruitment of the mid-level, local leader-
ship through offeri ng a more compelling narrative than that of the insu rgent 
effort. Accomplishing this requires an in-depth understanding of the motiva-
tions of loca lly respected individuals for joining armed groups. This typically 
involves developing a non-lethal program that allows a person to contribute 
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to h is/her community in a manner that is both loca lly and cultura lly appro-
priate to better both himself and his locale. Inducemcnts o f money, or o ffers 
o f employment, seldom counteract an insurgency. The message and means 
must be an inspiring alternative that l ifts the hearls of m en, rarher than 
an attempt to buy a man's soul. Simply allevialing poverty, or improving 
education, cannot enervate insurgent activity (USAID, 2010; Berman, Felter, 
Shapiro, & Callen, 2010). This means that the non-lethal , socioeconomic 
development component of a COIN erfo rl must be inherently indigenous in 
design, control , investment, maintenance, and result. It cannot be foreign led. 
Second, COIN programs must be decentralized. This requires a grea t 
degree of adaptability to ve,y loca l cond itions as well as the ability to 
respond qUickly to fine tune efforts under evolving condit ions. It recog-
nizes that various loca l leaders will have different reasons for aligning with 
an insurgency, in which grievances and goals are as varied as the individuals 
within a militant group. To the cxtent practicable, local custom and lead-
ership systems should remain intact, without exogenous interference. This 
point necessa rily requires a level of tolerance for va lues and ideals which are 
different from those held by the host countty and its allied forces engaged 
in COI N. Acquiescence to indigenous control over salient elements of COIN 
operations is both essential and difficult. However, unless a foreign power 
"ngaged in CO IN is wi ll ing to do just thaL, the necessaty decentralization and 
t1exibility will be lost. 
Th ird, successful COIN Simultaneously coord inates both inducement 
and punishment. Lethal and socioeconomic development activities must 
simultaneously occur in a coordinated and re-enforcing manner. Collective 
community reward in the form o f socioeconomic investment such as schools, 
health cl inics, roads, and improved water qua lity and sa nitation must be 
offered only to those communities that have chosen to actively participate 
in the COIN progra m. These rewards must be transparent and conSistently 
applied, as w ell as rapid. Likewise, collective community p unishment, in 
the form of withheld or cance lled development projects, must be applied to 
those communities thm, for whatever reason, have chosen not to engage 
in interdiction o f insurgents. This collective pun ishment, for fa iling to 
oppose insurgent operations must also be transparent, decisive, and in quick 
response. 
The founh key to the success o f COIN involves a kinetic component, 
that is, the lethal use of force. Such operations require specia lly trained 
clemenrs that mainta in a local and prolonged presence in communiries so 
as to ga in essentia l familia rity with the human, physica l , and tactical terrain. 
It is critica lly impo rlant that milira,y elements avoid a garrison melllality. 
COIN Forces must engage in a manner that maximizes constanr, varied, and 
disruptive movement. Il is seldom a pitched battle that defeats the guerrilla. 
Hather, the most effective tactic tends to be constant harassment that disrupts 
insurgent activity before it can be organized. 
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NIlCC believed that the individual guerri lla fighter is irrelevant in this 
guerrilla war. As Mao Tse-Tung stated in On Guerrilla War/a re, "a guerrilla 
can always sink back il1lo the peaceful population which is the sea in which 
the guerri lla swims like a fish " (Tse-Tung 1937/1961). While this maxim 
applies universally, it is a panicularly trenchant one for eastern Afghanistan, ir 
not the COUl1lry as a whole. Arghan government o lleagues at the Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development (M RRD), among other local comacts, 
unanimously echoed this po int when they emphasized that the individual's 
role and place in rural society is fundamentally tied to community. Young 
men in Afghanistan achieve status, self-worth, and promotion only through 
the social context of their communities. This is the "social man" that sets the 
direction and characteristics of a community. 
NRCC sought to empower existing loca l social institutions, which, in 
and o f itself, undermined the insurgent timber operat ions. Once villages saw 
the combination of benefits for their respected young men that accrued from 
panicipation in NRCC operations (w atershed rehabilitation through manually 
constructed terraces, check dams, water bars, and tree plal1ling), these com-
munities effectively applied traditional coercive social mechanisms, such as 
ostracism, against those individuals whose behaviors threatened the corpo-
rate whole. Within the larger COIN framework , NRCC attempted to dry the 
river in which the guerrilla swims. 
NRCC field data, consistel1l with recently published scientifi c and public 
policy findings (Meyerle, Karr, & Gravilis, 2010; Paul, Clarke, & Grill, 2010; 
Davis & Cragin, 2009) , found that among those destined to become leaders in 
insurgency, tlle desire for material well-being was not a prima.y motivation. 
Rather, NRCC data discovered that the chief motivation for participation in 
insurgel1l networks among this select group of young men in Afghanistan 
was some combination of: 
I. desire to protect the local community from alien influences; 
2. theocralic motivarionsj and 
3. obligation due to some prior association based upon family, group, or 
individual. 
Thus, it was determined by NRCC that those COIN programs that rocus 
solely upon income generation or shon-term job creation do linle to deter the 
recruitmem of potemial leaders into the insurgency. NRCC research did not 
address whether "cash-for-work" programs for deterring recruitment of lower 
level insurgent soldiers from among the ranks of the poor, was effective. 
Finally, the on-the-job appremicesh ip methods used by NRCC, were 
taken directly from the recommendations aniculated by USAID in its ret-
rospective analysis f development assistance to Afghanistan (Williams, 
Kean, Jenkins, Feldman , & Fisher-Harris, "1988). Williams et al. (988) found 
"on-the-job" apprenticeships ror semi-skilled p sit ions produced results far 
• 
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superior to those achieved th rough furmal vocational education, and could 
be accomplished at a lower cost. 
At the time the NRCC was disbanded , it had developed and was in 
the process implementing, each o f these four general principles in coordi-
nation with Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Teams (CAAT) and 
Special Forces (SF) Village Stability O perations ( VSO). The primalY unclassi-
fied programs included: (a) a database of timber network brands, identifying 
network operations and contracts; (b) simple and effective means o f iden-
tifying illegally smuggled cants with a w ood mo isture meter; (c) mento ring 
combat patro ls in improved community engagement; and (d) implementing 
an apprenticeship oriented watershed rehabilitation program . 
NRCC accompanied platoon combat patrols from a va riety of com-
bat outposts (COP) in order to find and document badas w ith stockpiled 
cants for the purpose o f identifying and deciphering smuggling networks 
by contract brand. As a result of this effort, NRCC built a photo library of 
1 SO different contract brands from the Narang, Chowka y, and Pech districts 
of Kunar Province. It became evident that each contmctor utilized a system 
of marks similar in appearance (though distinct) as a fo rm o f brand to indi-
cate control o f the wood they were moving. Because tht'se contractors w ere 
using variants along a similar themed deSign, it became possible to distill the 
hrand information and identify at least 10 principal contractors operating in 
these areas. This fact permitted coalition troops and Afghan police forces to 
track the inAuence of various contractors within specific geographic areas 
simply by estimating the propoltion o f illegal wood ascribed to a palticular 
cont.ra ctor based upon contract brand markings. 
NHCC sought to develop a quick , accurate, inexpensive, and simple 
method by which timber shipments could be evaluated for legality as they 
tmveled the stream of Afghanistan commerce. Such a method needed to nei-
ther deslr0Y the timber tested nor signifi cantly intrude upon the activities o f 
the transpo lters, lumberyard owners, or government o ffi Cials in whose cus-
tody the subject wood may be found . \'(Iood moisture content appeared to 
hold the greatest promise as an indicator of wood legal status. A cursory rest 
using meters (oven-d,y weight) found that wood moisture content o f 25% o r 
lower was achieved within a maximum of 240 days for stacked Cedl1ls deo-
dara , regardless of time o f the season the wood was stacked using wood and 
weather data from Forward Operating Bases (FO Bs) BleSSing, Bostick, and 
\'(Iright in conifer rich vall eys. In addition, NRCC estimated a Ced17/s deodC/ra 
density of 528 kg m- j and a fresh cut green moisture content of 58%. This is 
consistent with other findings-i .e., Sharm, Sankhayan, and Hofstad (20OS) 
and Hidayat and Simpson (1 994). As" result, a standard o f 25% wood mois-
ture content was assumed to conservatively identify illega l wood. Wood that 
was harvested and stockpiled prior to the 2006 ban (w hich is the only wood 
that can be legally sold) was presumed to have a stabilized air dry mo isture 
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the NllCC was disbanded. As a consequence, no fu rther efforts were made to 
investigate an objective and quantitative method for ascertaining the legality 
of wood sa les in eastern Afghanistan after 2011. 
Patrols from small COPs were accompanied by NRCC and evaluated 
for effectiveness in interactions with loca l residents from a non-letha l COIN 
perspective. Thus, military officers were informally evaluated in their inter-
actions with villagers in timber dependent valleys to ascertain effectiveness. 
Feedback was promptly provided in after action reviews that emphasized 
integrating traditional community engagement techniques to reduce local 
antagonisms. 
The NllCC watershed rehabilitation apprenticeship program, within its 
first 6 months, manually built 2,290 sto ne erosion control check dams and 
59,494 m of conservation terrace throughout 16 violent districts with about 
300 men (Kock, 2012). Average construction cost per check dam remained 
under $80 (U.S.) per dam and about $2 (U.S.) for each meter of terrace (Kock, 
2012). Speed of construction for these structures exceeded that of more tra-
ditional U5AlD and the 000 Commanders Emergency Response Program 
(CEllP) programs at a mere fraction of the cost. Military civil affairs person-
nel estimated that the NRCC program created dams at a rate 40 times faste r at 
a cost of about 5% that of tradit ional development programs in Afghanistan 
(NllCC, 2011b). The productivity of this program is an indication of com-
munity pa.ticipalion, sUPPOlT, and value. Before an NllCC apprenticeship 
team could form in a community, the loca l popul ation had to agree to sup-
ply daily security and logistics for its sons in the program. In addit ion, the 
local leaders had to demonstmte a willingness and abili ty to both protect the 
structures from insurgent attack and to maintain them once they were bu ilt. 
The degree to which insurgent recruitment of mid-level leaders diminished 
in villages where the apprenticeship program was implemented is unknown 
because the NRCC was disbanded prior to an assessment. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The NRCC study made a number of key findings: Ca) the timber tmde is 
a complex web involving Afghan government, insurgent, and criminal ele-
ments interacting together; (b) the comingling influences of cultu re, tmdition, 
and economic neceSSity, have made active and willing palTicipants of loca l 
communities in the illega l commercia l timber trade; Cc) active interdiction 
and smuggling disruption by international coa lition operations alienates loca l 
populat ions; Cd) the illega l timber trade poses a direct threat to successful 
COIN operations by the allied coa lition; and Ce) the disturbance to natural 
forest ecosystems iI Afghanistan is increasing. 
It is difficult to asce.tain the effective ness of the unclassified NRCC pro-
grams described herein regarding the effolT to disrupt insurgent exploitation 
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of timber as a means to support mil itant opermions in eastern Afghanistan. 
'I'he complex interacrion of military operations, traditional internationa l 
development programming by coa lition partners, and interna l insurgent 
dynam ics create a milieu w ithin wh ich it is nearly impossible to divine 
cause and effect. That sa id, it ca nnot be denied that insurgen t control of and 
reliance upon timber ;IS a weapon increased markedly during the period that 
the NRCC was in existence. It must ;rlso be noted that just as most of the 
unclassified NRCC projects were coming online, the NHCC was disbanded 
and the majority of its programming terminated. Anecdotal reponing from 
Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Tea ms and the SpeCial Forces 
Village Stability Operations personnel , however, indicated that NRCC oper-
ations directly confronted insurgent organizing effons in communities and 
was valued as a force multiplier. 
Perhaps the most usefu l outcome from NllCC is the detailed descrip-
tion of timber smuggling networks and the relationship to communities, 
os well as the finding that economic development cannot, in and of itself, 
reduce insurgent abili ties to recruit leadership from impoverished communi-
ties. This description identifies the linkages in, with, and among communities 
that thwart the notion o f interdiction alone as a mechanism to combat ille-
gal timber explOitation opera tions in a W311ime context, Indeed, removal or 
replacement of local centers of power-whether it is a national government, 
local warlord, or il1lernational insurgent and ten'orist organization-has little 
impact on the illegal activity. This is (rue to the extent that (he exigen-
cies of the power center dictated the type and degree of env ironmental 
di.stu rb~lnce, 
NRCC experience indicates that the primary motivation within the lead-
ership of a community (which drives insurgent behavior, economic decision 
making, or reconci liation) is grounded within a narrative of community con-
tribution. Therefore, international efforts to quell illegal natural resource 
exp lOitation must offer a counternarrative that induces emerging leaders into 
behavior perceived by the leaders themselves as contributing more produc-
tively, in a loca lly acceptable fashion, than the activi ties deemed as threats 
to U.S. national security. 
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